# 1AC

Normal

# 2AC

### 2ac prolif good – conventional warfare

#### Causes aggression – empirics

Kroenig 12 (Matthew Kroenig, associate professor of government @ Georgetown, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future,” 5-26-12, Prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30)

Regional instability: The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the “stability-instability paradox” maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability. [64] Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy. [65] Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India. [66] Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears a major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange. Nuclear proliferation can also lead to regional instability due to preventive strikes against nuclear programs. States often conduct preventive military strikes to prevent adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Historically, the United States attacked German nuclear facilities during World War II, Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981, Iraq bombed Iran’s Bushehr reactors in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and Iran returned the favor against an Iraqi nuclear plant, a U.S.-led international coalition destroyed Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in the first Gulf War in 1991, and Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor in 2007. These strikes have not led to extensive conflagrations in the past, but we might not be so lucky in the future. At the time of writing in 2012, the United States and Israel were polishing military plans to attack Iran’s nuclear program and some experts maintain that such a strike could very well lead to a wider war in the Middle East.

#### Bad intel causes conventional war

Debs & Monteiro 13 (Alexandre Debs, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University, Ph.D. Economics, M.I.T., M.Phil. Oxford University, B.Sc. Universite de Montreal; and Nuno P. Monteiro, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University, A.M., Ph.D. Political Science, University of Chicago, M.A. Political Theory and Science, Catholic University of Portugal, B.A. International Relations, University of Minho; “Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War,” International Organization, 7-30-2013, http://www.nunomonteiro.org/wp-content/uploads/Debs-Monteiro-2012-Known-Unknowns.pdf)

Abstract¶ Large and rapid power shifts resulting from exogenous economic growth are considered¶ sufficient to cause preventive wars. Such power shifts are rare, however. Most large and rapid¶ shifts result from endogenous military investments. In this case, preventive war requires¶ uncertainty about a state’s investment decision. When this decision is perfectly transparent,¶ peace always prevails. A state’s investment that would produce a large and rapid power shift¶ would prompt its adversaries to launch a preventive war. Internalizing this, the state is¶ deterred from investing. When investments may remain undetected, however, states may be¶ tempted to introduce large and rapid shifts in military power as a fait accompli. Knowing this,¶ their adversaries may strike preventively even without unambiguous evidence about¶ militarization. In fact, the more effective preventive wars are, the more likely they will be¶ launched against states that are not militarizing. Our argument restricts the role of¶ commitment problems and emphasizes the role of imperfect information as causes of war. It¶ also provides an account of why powerful states may attack weaker targets suspected of¶ military investments even in the absence of conclusive information. We illustrate our theory¶ through an account of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

### 2ac rollback

#### Statistically *negligible* risk of rollback – prefer *empirical studies*

--collective action problems mean even if some members support rollback, there’s not enough and they can’t organize

--statistical studies prove the risk is less than 0.02% - proves any risk of the NB mathematically outweighs

Krause & Cohen 2K (George and David, Professors of Political Science @ South Carolina, “Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The Issuance of Executive Orders” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1, February 2000, JSTOR)

We use the annual number of executive orders issued by presidents from 1939 to 1996 to test our hypotheses. Executive orders possess a number of properties that make them appropriate for our purposes. First, the series of executive orders is long, and we can cover the entirety of the institutionalizing and institutional-ized eras to date.6 Second, unlike research on presidential vetoes (Shields and Huang 1997) and public activities (Hager and Sullivan 1994), which have found support for presidency-centered variables but not president-centered factors, ex-ecutive orders offer a stronger possibility that the latter set of factors will be more prominent in explaining their use. One, they are more highly discretionary than vetoes.7 More critically, presidents take action first and unilaterally. In addition, **Congress has** tended to allow executive orders to stand **due to its own** collective action problems **and the** cumbersomeness of using the legislative process **to reverse or stop such presidential actions.** Moe and Howell (1998) report that between 1973 and 1997, **Congress challenged** only 36 of more than 1,000 executive orders issued**. And** only two of these 36 challenges led to overturning **the president's executive order. Therefore, presidents are likely to be** very successful **in implementing their own agendas through such actions**. In fact, the nature of executive orders leads one to surmise that idiopathic factors will be relatively more important than presidency-centered variables in explaining this form of presidential action. Finally, executive orders have rarely been studied quantitatively (see Gleiber and Shull 1992; Gomez and Shull 1995; Krause and Cohen 1997)8, so a description of the factors motivating their use is worth-while.9 Such a description will allow us to determine the relative efficacy of these competing perspectives on presidential behavior.10

#### Their ev only says it’s theoretically *possible* – ours proves it’s overwhelmingly *improbable*

--informational deficits mean it’s always easier to mobilize support than opposition

--political incentives favor doing nothing – criticism pays better dividends than action

Howell 3 (William G, Assistant Professor of Gov’t @ Harvard, Powers without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action pg. 112)

The real world, obviously, is much more complicated than the unilateral politics model supposes. Uncertainties abound, and presidents frequently set policies without any assurance of congressional acquiescence. It is worth considering then, how presidents fare on those occasions when Congress does respond to a presidential directive. Do presidents tend to win most of the time? Or does Congress consistently crack the legislative whip, effectively enervating imperialistic presidents? Our theoretical expectation are relatively clear. Because the president has access to more (and better) information about goings-on in the executive branch, members of Congress will try to change only a small fraction of all status quo policies in any legislative session, and we should anticipate that members will leave alone the majority of unilateral directives that the president issues. While the president may occasionally overreach on a particularly salient issue, provoking a congressional response, in most instances Congress either will do nothing at all or will endorse the president’s actions.

### 2ac t no migration

#### Economic engagement is determined by means, not ends – agreeing to ease financial restrictions is distinct from travel promotion

Resnick 1 (Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco | Danco)

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas.¶ Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits.¶ A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT¶ In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:¶ DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS¶ Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations¶ Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes¶ Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa¶ MILITARY CONTACTS¶ Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa¶ Arms transfers¶ Military aid and cooperation¶ Military exchange and training programs¶ Confidence and security-building measures¶ Intelligence sharing¶ ECONOMIC CONTACTS¶ Trade agreements and promotion¶ Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants¶ CULTURAL CONTACTS¶ Cultural treaties¶ Inauguration of travel and tourism links¶ Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25)¶ Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.26 For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.27 Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state.¶ This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.28¶ Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.¶ This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Economic engagement includes offers to remove financial restrictions – distinct from travel promotion

Haass and O’Sullivan 2K (Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, previously Director of Policy Planning for the United States Department of State and close advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell, received the State Department's Distinguished Service Award, and Meghan O’Sullivan, former deputy national security adviser on Iraq and Afghanistan, Jeane Kirkpatrick Professor of the Practice of International Affairs, adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy,” Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 5-6, Google Book)

As is evident from the fairly small existing literature on the use of incentives in foreign policy, many different engagement strategies exist, depending¶ on such variables as the actors engaged, the incentives employed, and the objectives pursued. The first important distinction to be made in any typology¶ of engagement is whether the strategy is conditional or unconditional. A strategy of unconditional engagement would offer certain changes in U.S. policy¶ toward the country without the explicit agreement that a reciprocal act would¶ follow. Depending on the intention behind these unconditional initiatives—¶ and, of course, the reaction of the target country—this form of engagement¶ may be short-lived. Charles Osgood, in his GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension reduction) theory offers a model of cooperation¶ that stems from an uninvited, opening initiative by one country.8¶ Although¶ the act in itself is unconditional, the failure of the target country to reciprocate with meaningful gestures soon leads to the abandonment of the strategy; alternatively, if the initial accommodating steps are met with positive¶ moves, cooperation ensues. President George Bush’s 1991 nuclear reduction initiative, which was reciprocated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev,¶ is one instance of a GRIT approach spurring cooperation. Conciliatory gestures made by the United States to Iran in March 2000 may be another.¶ Another form of unconditional engagement takes a broader perspective,¶ by regarding inducements offered to civil society and the private sector over¶ time as playing an important role in creating openings for cooperation further down the road. In these unconditional strategies, certain initiatives or¶ changes in U.S. policy toward the country are made without necessarily expecting, or even soliciting, reciprocal acts from the regime. This form of¶ engagement may be implemented by nongovernmental actors, such as the¶ programs sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy that promote democracy and the development of institutions in many authoritarian regimes. Alternatively, this engagement may entail explicit modifications¶ to U.S. policy, as occurred with Cuba in March 1998 and January 1999. By¶ allowing licensed sales of food and agricultural inputs to independent entities in Cuba, by easing travel and financial restrictions, and by promoting¶ communication between America and the island, the United States sought¶ to buttress the development of civil society and the private sector in Cuba.9¶ In doing so, the United States hoped to build momentum leading to greater¶ political changes, which would facilitate U.S.-Cuban cooperation in the future, perhaps many years down the road.¶ In contrast, the expectations surrounding conditional engagement strategies are more contractual; in its most narrow form of the tit-for-tat process¶ explored by Robert Axelrod, cooperation is based on a strict cycle of reciprocity.10 However, conditional engagement can also refer to a much less¶ tightly orchestrated series of exchanges in which the United States extends¶ inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. These desired¶ alterations in the behavior of the target country may be particular, welldefined policy stances, or as in the case of Alexander George’s conditional¶ reciprocity, they may refer to more vague changes in attitudes and the overall orientation of regimes.11 While recognizing the subtle differences among¶ the various concepts of conditional engagement, this book uses the term¶ largely to refer to strategies of reciprocity with focused, policy objectives in¶ mind. The Agreed Framework struck between the United States and North¶ Korea in 1994 is one such example. In a specific effort to curtail nuclear¶ proliferation, America linked the provision of economic incentives to the¶ fulfillment of North Korean commitments to halt Pyongyang’s development¶ of nuclear weapons.¶ Architects of engagement strategies have a wide variety of incentives from¶ which to choose. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such¶ as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology,¶ loans, and economic aid.12 Other equally useful economic incentives involve¶ the removal of penalties, whether they be trade embargoes, investment bans,¶ or high tariffs that have impeded economic relations between the United¶ States and the target country. In addition, facilitated entry into the global¶ economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most¶ potent incentives in today’s global market.13¶ Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, or the scheduling of¶ summits between leaders—or the termination of these benefits. Military¶ engagement could involve the extension of International Military Educational Training (IMET) both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and¶ human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers.14¶ These areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, while cultural or civil society engagement is likely to entail building¶ people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organizations, facilitating the flow of remittances, establishing postal and telephone links between the United States and the target country, and promoting the exchange¶ of students, tourists, and other nongovernmental people between the countries are some of the incentives that might be offered under a policy of cultural engagement.

### 2ac appeasement

#### Cutbacks in democracy promotion are perceived as appeasement now

Tamayo 13 (Juan Tamayo, staff writer for the Miami Herald, “Report: John Kerry held secret talks with Cuba to free Alan Gross,” Miami Herald, 1-6-13, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/01/06/v-print/3170632/report-john-kerry-held-secret.html)//RDa

Sen. John Kerry, nominated as the next secretary of state, held a secret meeting with Cuba’s foreign minister in 2010 in a failed bid to win the release of jailed USAID subcontractor Alan Gross, according to a published report. A senior state department official also met in secret with Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez to discuss the Gross case, but the foreign minister lectured the U.S. official for an hour, added the report in the respected magazine Foreign Affairs. José Cardenas, a former top official at the U.S. Agency for International Development, wrote that the article amounted to a “lesson on the folly of attempting to appease dictators.” A knowledgeable Senate aide also challenged the article’s description of the role that Fulton Armstrong, a senior staffer in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former CIA analyst, played in the campaign to free Gross. Gross was arrested in Havana in late 2009 and sentenced to 15 years for giving Cuban Jews sophisticated communications equipment paid for by USAID’s “pro-democracy” programs, outlawed by Cuba as designed to bring about “regime change.” His continued detention has been a key block in efforts to improve U.S.-Cuba relations. The report authored by R.M Schneiderman, an editor at Newsweek, includes previously unknown details of a U.S. effort to win Gross’ freedom by cutting back funding for the pro-democracy programs and making them less provocative to Cuba. In September of 2010, Spanish government officials helped arrange a secret meeting between then-Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela and Rodríguez to discuss a possible release of Gross, according to Schneiderman. “The Cubans were far less flexible than the Americans expected. The U.S. … wanted Cuba to release Gross, and only then would it press ahead on any other policy changes,” he wrote. “Rodríguez allegedly lectured Valenzuela for roughly an hour on Cuba’s history of grievances.” A month later, at the request of Cuban diplomats in Washington and with State Department approval, Kerry met with Rodríguez at the home of Cuba’s ambassador to the United Nations in New York, according to the report. “There was no quid pro quo, but the meeting seemed to reassure the Cubans that the democracy programs would change, and the Cubans expressed confidence” that Gross would be freed after his trial, which was held in March of 2011, the report noted. President Barack Obama has nominated Kerry, a Massachusetts Democrat and backer of improving relations with Cuba, to succeed Hillary Clinton. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Kerry chairs, is expected to easily approve the nomination. Schneiderman wrote that in early 2010, the State Department and USAID asked Armstrong, who had long criticized the programs as inefficient and wasteful, to help them make the programs less offensive to Havana — hoping Cuba might then free Gross. And that summer, “at State’s behest,” Armstrong began meeting with officials at the Cuban diplomatic mission in Washington to tell them about the changes that were being made to the programs, Schneiderman wrote. “We said, ‘Look, message received,’ ” he quoted Armstrong as saying. “‘These [programs] are stupid. We’re cleaning them up. Just give us time, because politically we can’t kill them.’” The Cubans seemed appreciative. “We asked them, ‘Will this help you release Alan Gross?’ ” Armstrong went on. “And the answer was yes.’” But Sen. Bob Menendez, a powerful Cuban American Democrat from New Jersey, stepped in to defend the programs in the spring of 2011 and persuaded the White House to roll back most of the changes, Schneiderman wrote. Havana grew chary at the same time, he added, as Raúl Castro faced domestic opposition to his economic reforms and a U.S. jury acquitted Luis Posada Carriles, a Cuban exile blamed for several Havana bombings, of lying to U.S. immigration officials. “Mired in mistrust and miscalculation, each side seemed to be waiting for the other to blink,” he wrote. “Eventually, however, the United States appeared to step back from an opportunity to free Gross from jail and strike a blow against the antiquated politics of the Cold War … The Cuban-American lobby had won.” Schneiderman’s article drew harsh criticisms from those who favor the USAID programs like Cardenas, who was the agency’s deputy assistant administrator during the George W. Bush administration. The article showed “the heroic efforts of some Obama administration officials to give the Castro regime everything it wanted” for Gross, he wrote in a column published in several Web sites. “Offering to gut a democracy program because a dictatorship opposes it sends a terrible message to authoritarian regimes around the globe.” Cardenas also described Armstrong as “an unabashed promoter of U.S.-Cuba normalization” and added, “Let’s hope this Fulton Armstrong-led fiasco puts an end to any more appeasement attempts.” Armstrong was the CIA’s top Latin America analyst 2000-2004, was assigned to the Clinton White House and later to NATO in Europe. A colleague at the Pentagon, Cuba analyst Ana Belén Montes, was arrested in 2001 for spying for Havana and is now serving a 25-year sentence. After retiring from the CIA in 2008 he became a senior staffer at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and left in 2011 to become a senior fellow at American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies in Washington. He did not return an El Nuevo Herald email requesting an interview for this story. A senior Senate Republican aide with first-hand knowledge of USAID’s Cuba programs meanwhile said that Schneiderman exaggerated the role Armstrong played in the effort to win Gross’s release in 2010 and 2011. “My talks with DOS [Department of State] yielded the contrary, that DOS was annoyed at Fulton, wanted him to butt out,” the aide, who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to comment, wrote in an email to El Nuevo Herald. “His efforts actually made it harder ... for the DOS to get Gross out, because Fulton set unrealistic expectations that the Cubans believed and that were politically impossible in the US,” the aide added. Cuban officials have now made it all but clear that it will release Gross early only if the U.S. government frees five Cuban spies convicted in a Miami trial in 1998 as part of the “Wasp network.” The Obama administration has said repeatedly no swap is possible because Gross is not a spy. Schneiderman wrote that Cuba’s offer is “a position that many think is negotiable.”

#### Plan increases credibility – benefits outweigh risks

Safran 12 (8/14/12, Brian Safran, Master of Science in Global Affairs, “End the Cuban Embargo - Brian Safran,” <http://briansafran.blogspot.com/2012/08/end-cuban-embargo-brian-safran.html> | Danco)

Global public opinion perceives the United States as engaging in strong economic and political tactics such as the Cuban embargo in an effort to further its own world domination. This sentiment serves to divert attention from the evils of Cuban communism, and instead focus international pressure on the United States; serving to render the existing embargo less effective. Some say that the United States would stand to lose its credibility if it were to put an end to the embargo without its having accomplished its goals in totality. However, the anti-U.S. sentiment on a global scale derived from its continuation is of much greater detriment to U.S. interests than the short-term loss in credibility it may experience by reorganizing its policy. Although in a prior historical era the Cuban embargo and its intended goals might have been seen by the international community as justifiable, the U.S. intervention in Cuba has now come to symbolize the domineering and intolerant methodology that it fosters in many of its international engagements.

#### Credibility on Cuba doesn’t affect other countries – Syria proves

Friedersdorf 13 (Conor Friedersdorf, founding editor of The Best of Journalism and staff writer, “A Vote Against Syria Won't Destroy the President's Credibility,” The Atlantic, 9-10-13, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/a-vote-against-syria-wont-destroy-the-presidents-credibility/279498/> | Danco)

If Congress denies Barack Obama permission to strike Syria, will that "basically finish off the current American president as a credible actor on the world stage"? Numerous advocates of intervention have made that argument in recent days, and now they've been joined by Ross Douthat of The New York Times, who warns that an "unprecedented" vote of that sort "wouldn’t just be a normal political rebuke of President Obama," but "a remarkable institutional rebuke of his presidency, with unknowable consequences for the credibility of American foreign policy."¶ Douthat writes:¶ Presidential credibility is an intangible thing, and the term has been abused over the years by overeager hawks and cult-of-the-presidency devotees. But the global system really does depend on other nations’ confidence that the United States means what it says -- that the promises the White House and the State Department make are binding, that our military commitments aren’t just so much bluster, and that when the president speaks on foreign policy he has the power to live up to his words.¶ It is to President Obama’s great discredit that he has staked this credibility on a vote whose outcome he failed to game out in advance. But if he loses that vote, the national interest as well as his political interests will take a tangible hit: for the next three years, American foreign policy will be in the hands of a president whose promises will ring consistently hollow, and whose ability to make good on his strategic commitments will be very much in doubt.¶ That's an eloquent statement of an unpersuasive argument. Its smaller mistaken premise: "The global system really does depend on other nations’ confidence that the United States means what it says." That's an empirically false statement. Presidents of the United States say things that they don't mean all the time. The White House and the State Department break promises all the time. This has been so through all the decades that we've led the current global order.¶ To speak on this subject circumspectly, it must be conceded that lots of false statements, like "I will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay" or "Our goal isn't regime change in Libya" do little if anything to jeopardize the world order, while other broken pledges, like "I will uphold our NATO obligations if a member state suffers an unprovoked attack," would be hugely significant if they occured.¶ Into which category does Syria fall?¶ If President Obama is prohibited from intervening, other countries may well be reminded that the Constitution gives America's legislature the power to declare war, and marginally discount presidential saber rattling regarding wars of choice that haven't yet been endorsed by Congress. And that narrow, particular loss of credibility would be salutary, for reasons that Jim Manzi adeptly explains.¶ But there is no reason to believe that failing to intervene in Syria would affect, for example, the global system's understanding of how the United States would react to a North Korean attack on the demilitarized zone, or an Iranian attack on Israel, or aggressive moves by China to assert more power in the Pacific Ocean.¶ Noah Millman draws the important distinctions:¶ Congress, if it votes no, would not be refusing to back up an American treaty obligation, nor would it even be rejecting a painstakingly negotiated international agreement. In other words, it would neither be going back on America’s sworn word, nor undermining the ability of the Executive to negotiate. It would be refusing to endorse a decision to take aggressive action that is not required by any treaty obligation and that appears to have been prompted by an off-the-cuff remark. If, in future, foreign capitals doubt whether such remarks are to be taken seriously unless they either fit into longstanding policy or are corroborated by other policymakers, that’s all to the good.¶ It's also important to remember that remarks by the president, off-the-cuff or otherwise, aren't the only or even the primary way that other states gauge the likelihood that America will or won't act to back up what we've said we're going to do. America's actions flow from our interests, the risks and rewards of pursuing them in a given situation, and the absolute and relative power that we enjoy.¶ In Syria, the U.S. faces significant risks and meager rewards in a matter peripheral to our interests. Foreign observers understand how that shapes our actions.¶ A final problem with Douthat's piece is its failure to consider all of the ways that a president might lose international credibility. Had George W. Bush backed down just prior to the Iraq invasion, reversing himself about the wisdom of giving the weapons inspectors more time and his certainty about the presence of WMDs, many in the world would have cast the reversal as a blow to his credibility. But in hindsight, it's easy to see that Bush and the United States lost far more credibility by invading a foreign country on false pretenses, failing to adequately plan for the occupation, utterly failing to anticipate sectarian violence, suffering thousands of casualties over a bloody decade, and departing as losers.¶ Douthat points out at the end of his column that a loss of presidential credibility "is not an argument that justifies voting for a wicked or a reckless war, and members of Congress who see the Syria intervention in that light must necessarily oppose it." What I wish he'd have added is that there are all sorts of scenarios in which intervening would damage Obama's credibility far more than not intervening. A strike on Syria preserves rather than destroys presidential credibility only if you assume that it proceeds smoothly. But there is no reason to make that assumption! Even in Douthat's exaggerated account of how much a blow to Obama's credibility matters, he casts the problem as lasting until January 2017, when a new president takes office. By way of contrast, an intervention in Syria that proved even 25 percent as catastrophic as Iraq would do far more damage to American credibility for many more years into the future.¶ The overall credibility of America isn't at stake when Congress votes on Syria. Not even Obama's overall credibility is on the line. Insofar as a no vote will diminish presidential credibility, it will do so in this narrow sense: Obama, and perhaps future presidents, will be less able to credibly threaten unilateral wars of choice. Given how badly such wars have worked out that's no great loss, especially since a credible American threat would still always be a congressional vote away. As Kevin Drum puts it, "I doubt that this vote will be taken as much of a precedent. But if it were, the precedent it sets would be simple: the United States won't undertake military action unless it's so plainly justified that both parties are willing to support it. That would frankly be no bad thing. Unfortunately, once they get in office American presidents of both parties seem to find no end of wars to fight overseas. Reining them in a bit would be commendable."

### 2ac security

#### Extinction comes first – no other prior questions

Bostrom 12 – Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### Securitizing the environment is good – builds public awareness – and link turns their scholarship args

Matthew 02 (Richard A, associate professor of international relations and environmental political at the University of California at Irvine, Summer, ECSP Report 8:109-124)

In addition, environmental security's language and findings can benefit conservation and sustainable development."' Much environmental security literature emphasizes the importance of development assistance, sustainable livelihoods, fair and reasonable access to environmental goods, and conservation practices as the vital upstream measures that in the long run will contribute to higher levels of human and state security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are examples of bodies that have been quick to recognize how the language of environmental security can help them. The scarcity/conflict thesis has alerted these groups to prepare for the possibility of working on environmental rescue projects in regions that are likely to exhibit high levels of related violence and conflict. These groups are also aware that an association with security can expand their acceptance and constituencies in some countries in which the military has political control, For the first time in its history; the contemporary environmental movement can regard military and intelligence agencies as potentialallies in the struggle to contain or reverse humangenerated environmental change. (In many situations, of course, the political history of the military--as well as its environmental record-raise serious concerns about the viability of this cooperation.) Similarly, the language of security has provided a basis for some fruitful discussions between environmental groups and representatives of extractive industries. In many parts of the world, mining and petroleum companies have become embroiled in conflict. These companies have been accused of destroying traditional economies, cultures, and environments; of political corruption; and of using private militaries to advance their interests. They have also been targets of violence, Work is now underway through the environmental security arm of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) to address these issues with the support of multinational corporations. Third, the general conditions outlined in much environmental security research can help organizations such as USAID, the World Bank, and IUCN identify priority cases--areas in which investments are likely to have the greatest ecological and social returns. For all these reasons, IUCN elected to integrate environmental security into its general plan at the Amman Congress in 2001. Many other environmental groups and development agencies are taking this perspective seriously (e.g. Dabelko, Lonergan& Matthew, 1999). However, for the most part these efforts remain preliminary.' Conclusions Efforts to dismiss environment and security research and policy activities on the grounds that they have been unsuccessful are premature and misguided. This negative criticism has all too often been based on an excessively simplified account of the research findings of Homer-Dixon and a few others. Homer-Dixon’s scarcity-conflict thesis has made important and highly visible contributions to the literature, but it is only a small part of a larger and very compelling theory. This broader theory has roots in antiquity and speaks to the pervasive conflicts and security implications of complex nature-society relationships. The theory places incidents of violence in larger structural and historical contexts while also specifying contemporarily significant clusters of variables. From this more generalized and inclusive perspective, violence and conflict are revealed rarely as a society’s endpoint and far more often as parts of complicated adaptation processes. The contemporary research on this classical problematic has helped to revive elements of security discourse and analysis that were marginalized during the Cold War. It has also made valuable contributions to our understanding of the requirements of human security, the diverse impacts of globalization, and the nature of contemporary transnational security threats. Finall,y environmental security research has been valuable in myriad ways to a range of academics, policymakers, and activists, although the full extent of these contributions remains uncertain, rather than look for reasons to abandon this research and policy agenda, now is the time to recognize and to build on the remarkable achievements of the entire environmental security field.

#### Disease securitization good – mobilizes international coalitions to prevent and contain outbreaks

Dr. Christian Enemark, 3-1-2005, Visiting Fellow of the John Curtin School of Medical Research at ANU where he serves as Deputy Director of the National Centre for Biosecurity.'INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY', The Nonproliferation Review, 12(1), 107-125

In pursuing international cooperation, a threshold issue is how to win political acceptance for the idea that some infectious diseases pose a threat to security as well as to health. To securitize infectious diseases is to seek some of the overriding political interest and superior financial resources associated with more traditional (military) concepts of security. Labeling something a security issue lends it a sense of urgency, attracts greater public attention, and implicitly demands resources.1 There is a strong humanitarian imperative to mitigate the huge potential and actual loss of life resulting from infectious disease, but humanitarian motivations alone are not sufficient to address this problem. In appealing to national governments\*/still the principal players in the international arena\*/infectious diseases need to be portrayed in such a way as to stimulate concerns about national interests. Historically, governments have shown greater enthusiasm toward their own security than they have toward humanitarian causes.A good introduction to the way in which infectious diseases impact security is to examine their relevance to military operations throughout history. The historian Livy described an outbreak of plague in the Carthaginian and Roman armies during the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC. The Carthaginians, less accustomed than the Romans to the city’s moist climate, suffered greater casualties from the disease and were defeated shortly afterward.2 In the thirteenth century, the Mongol invasions helped spread various epidemics of plague between East Asia and Eastern Europe. The sixteenth century demise of the Aztec empire came about mostly because the Spanish conquerors brought smallpox and measles with them to the New World. During World War I, an outbreak of typhus in Serbia in 1915 was so severe that the fighting on both sides stopped for six months.And disease was relevant in April 2003 when Canada’s health minister suggested that medical staff from the Canadian Forces could help relieve pressure on Toronto hospital staff treating patients with SARS. The military replied that it was already critically short of physicians to look after its troops. At the time, Canada was preparing for a major deployment to Afghanistan. Had the SARS outbreak in Toronto become so bad as to require medical personnel from Canadian military units to assist, those units would not have been able to deploy overseas.3 In one sense, infectious diseases are already an ‘‘established’’ security threat in the form of biological warfare. Weapons for deliberately disseminating pathogenic micro­organisms potentially pose direct security threats to many countries. BW is not a new threat like emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and it fits more easily within traditional conceptions of security. For these reasons, attempts to link disease and security via the problem of BW tend to resonate more strongly with the public and policymakers. But biological weapons are just one part of a spectrum of risks associated with the biological sciences. The spectrum encompasses natural disease outbreaks, accidents arising from otherwise benign activities such as medical research with pathogens, and the use of disease as a weapon of war or terror.5

#### Nuclear weapon securitization good – empowers anti-prolif movements

Babst 97, retired government scientist and Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation's Accidental Nuclear War Studies program, Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and Aldridge, former aerospace engineer, now leads the Pacific Life Research Center, ’97 (Dean, David, and Bob, November, “The self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons: a dangerous and costly mental block” Canadian Business and Current Affairs, Vol 29 No 97 p 11-19)

There is worldwide reluctance to think about the self-destructive consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Though understandable, this reluctance is dangerous and costly. It prevents public discourse and political engagement by citizens of the nuclear-weapons states concerning one of the most important issues of our time. The lack of public attention in nuclear-weapons states tothe self-destructiveness of nuclear weapons has allowed humankind to place itself in danger of annihilation, and to spend some $8 trillion over the course of the nuclear age doing so. Denial of the dangers or likelihood of nuclear-weapons use has created a dangerous mental block that must be overcome. We owe it to ourselves and to our posterity to break through this mental block and directly confront the dangers of annihiliaton, including self-annihilation, inherent in reliance on nuclear arsenals. We reasoned that if the citizens in nuclear-weapons states understood that the use of a hundred or so nuclear weapons could turn the world into an unbearable place in which to live, they would take a less complacent view of maintaining nuclear arsenals. We believed that an awareness of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear arsenals would lead to a general understanding that nuclear weapons are a source of insecurity rather than security. This understanding, we reasoned, would lead to a desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. We discovered, however, that virtually nothing was being published on the subject of the self-destructive consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The fact that an issue as important as this one was not even being discussed in the mass media alerted us to the existence of widespread public denial regarding this issue. We also realized that the issue of nuclear arsenals and their use was not even entering into public debate during elections in the nuclear-weapons states. As we looked into this situation further, we found many other indications of public denial of the suicidal dangers of nuclear arsenals. We have listed some of these indications below.

#### ALT causes transition wars – escalate due to unpreparedness

Doran ‘99 (Charles F. Doran, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, “Is major war obsolete? An exchange,” Survival, 41(2), Summer 1999, Proquest)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that **as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including** presumably **governments**, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, **the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence** and security **necessary to maintain deterrence**, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz's most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that **surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and** all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that **leads in the end to war**.

#### Modern democratic structures check their impacts

**Dickinson ‘4** (Edward Ross Dickinson, professor of modern history, University of Cincinnati, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy”, Central European History, 37(1), 2004, ejournals)

In short, the **continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time** are unmistakable. Both are instances of the "disciplinary society" and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis **can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different** strategic and local **dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes**. **Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism**. Above all, again, **it has nowhere developed the** fateful, **radicalizing dynamic** that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic **that leads from economistic population management to mass murder**. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce "health," such a system can -- and historically does -- create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, **there are political and policy** potentials and **constraints** in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. **Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of** self-direction and **participation that is functionally incompatible with** authoritarian or **totalitarian structures**. And **this pursuit of biopolitical ends through** a regime of **democratic citizenship** **does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a "logic" or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.(n90) Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of "liberty," just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics**, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not "opposites," in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept "power" should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively "the same." Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, "tactically polyvalent." Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create "multiple modernities," modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.(n91)

#### ALT fails – causes interventionism – turns the K

Tara McCormack 10, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of **problematising weak or unstable states** and allowing international institutions or major states **a more interventionary role**, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations**. This has the consequence of **entrenching international power inequalities** and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means **the condemnation of millions to** **a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival**. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful sta**tes**, we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### ALT fails – can’t overcome realism

Wendt ‘92 (Alexander Wendt, the Ralph D. Mershon Professor of International Security at Ohio State University, former professor at Chicago, Dartmouth, and Yale, Ph.D. Political Science, University of Minnesota, “Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, 46(2), Spring 1992, p.410-412, JSTOR)

Let us assume that processes of identity- and interest-formation have created a world in which states do not recognize rights to territory or existence—a war of all against all. In this world, anarchy has a “realist” meaning for state action: be insecure and concerned with relative power. Anarchy has this meaning only in virtue of collective, insecurity-producing practices, but if those practices are relatively stable, they do constitute a system that may resist change. The fact that worlds of power politics are socially constructed, in other words, does not guarantee they are malleable, for at least two reasons. The first reason is that once constituted, any social system confronts each of its members as an objective social fact that reinforces certain behaviors and discourages others. Self-help systems, for example, tend to reward competition and punish altruism. The possibility of change depends on whether the exigencies of such competition leave room for actions that deviate from the prescribed script. If they do not, the system will be reproduced and deviant actors will not.64 The second reason is that systemic change may also be inhibited by actors’ interests in maintaining relatively stable role identities. Such interests are rooted not only in the desire to minimize uncertainty and anxiety, manifested in efforts to confirm existing beliefs about the social world, but also in the desire to avoid the expected costs of breaking commitments made to others—notably domestic constituencies and foreign allies in the case of states—as part of past practices. The level of resistance that these commitments induce will depend on the “salience” of particular role identities to the actor.65 The United States, for example, is more likely to resist threats to its identity as “leader of anticommunist crusades” than to its identity as “promoter of human rights.” But for almost any role identity, practices and information that challenge it are likely to create cognitive dissonance and even perceptions of threat, and these may cause resistance to transformations of the self and thus to social change.66 For both systemic and “psychological” reasons, then, intersubjective understandings and expectations may have a self-perpetuating quality, constituting path-dependencies that new ideas about self and other must transcend. This does not change the fact that through practice agents are continuously producing and reproducing identities and interests, continuously “choosing now the preferences [they] will have later.”67 But it does mean that choices may not be experienced with meaningful degrees of freedom. This could be a constructivist justification for the realist position that only simple learning is possible in self-help systems. The realist might concede that such systems are socially constructed and still argue that after the corresponding identities and interests have become institutionalized, they are almost impossible to transform.

### 2ac conditions cp

#### Perm – do the counterplan – it’s not severance – “offer” only establishes the starting conditions

Poucke and Buelens 02 (Dirk van Poucke and Marc Buelens, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, Ghent University, “Predicting the outcome of a two-party price negotiation: Contribution of reservation price, aspiration price and opening offer,” Journal of Economic Psychology #23, 67-76)//RDa

Participants negotiate after reading their confidential instructions. Before negotiating, they determine privately and individually their intended opening offer, their aspiration and their reservation price. Reservation price is defined as the ‘limit’ (i.e., ‘‘the lowest/highest price you as a seller/buyer are ready to sell/buy’’). Aspiration price is defined as the ‘target’ (i.e., ‘‘the price you would like to obtain; your best price’’). Intended opening offer is defined as the asking price/first offer (‘‘the price you are going to ask/give at the start of the negotiation; the first price you are going to mention’’). It is important to note that opening offer is not the first price actually mentioned, but the intented opening offer.

#### Cuba says no and hurts relations

Landau French 9 (Anya Landau French, Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation, former Senior Fellow at the Lexington Institute, former International Trade Advisor to Chairman Max Baucus, Senate Finance Committee, M.A. International Education, George Washington University, B.A. English, “Options for Engagement: A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba,” Lexington Institute, April 2009, p.44, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/options-for-engagement.pdf)

Even with the core of the trade embargo remaining in place over the near term, there is much the President and the Congress ¶ can immediately do to move U.S. Cuba policy in a more constructive direction. In particular, the President retains broad ¶ authority with respect to initiating or increasing security cooperation and to ease certain financial and commercial restrictions, ¶ without lifting them entirely.¶ This policy assessment explores more than 70 policy options that President Obama and the 111th Congress could take separately ¶ and together to renovate U.S. policy toward Cuba – without lifting the entire embargo. All of the options presented would ¶ serve a new policy of American engagement – cultural, professional, economic and humanitarian – with the Cuban people, of ¶ building a positive U.S. influence on the island, and of protecting U.S. security, economic and ethical interests.¶ Whichever options the President and the Congress may choose to exercise, suggested herein or elsewhere, each should avoid ¶ embracing a condition-based policy on Cuba. The government of Cuba has indicated that it is not moved by U.S. “offers” in ¶ exchange for internal political changes. U.S. efforts are likely to see greater success if they center on protecting and advancing ¶ American security and economic interests, nurturing a constructive bilateral dialogue on difficult issues, and broadly contributing ¶ to greater economic and political openness and opportunity on the island.

#### Only perm solves – plan demonstrates willingness and implicitly conditions full normalization upon the counterplan – which is what their evidence assumes anyway

Pascual, et al 9 (Carlos Pascual, State Department Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, former Ambassador to Mexico, former Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, M.P.P Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Stanford University; and Vicki Huddleston, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, former Ambassador to Mali, former Principal Officer of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana (equivalent of Ambassador to a state with no official diplomatic relations), former Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution; Co-Directors, Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, “CUBA: A New Policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement,” Report of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Toward a Cuba in Transition, April 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413\_cuba.pdf)

Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the¶ Obama administration because it offers a unique¶ opportunity for the president to transform our relations with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away¶ from hostility to engagement will permit the United¶ States to work more closely with the region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba.¶ By announcing a policy of critical and constructive¶ engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in¶ Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that¶ he has been listening to the region. He can underline this commitment by removing all restrictions¶ on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans,¶ and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as promised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of the island, its people,¶ and its leaders. However, while these measures will¶ promote understanding, improve the lives of people¶ on the island, and build support for a new relationship between our countries, they are insufficient to¶ ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time.¶ If the president is to advance U.S. interests and¶ principles, he will need a new policy and a long-¶ term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba.¶ if he is prepared to discard the failed policy of¶ regime change and adopt one of critical and constructive engagement, he and his administration¶ will lay the foundations for a new approach toward Cuba and the Latin America.¶ Like his predecessors,¶ President Obama has the authority¶ to substantially modify embargo regulations in¶ order to advance a policy of engagement that would¶ broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban¶ people and their government. He has the popular¶ support—domestic and international—to engage¶ Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island and recapture the high¶ road in our relations with the hemisphere.¶ Although it will take Cuban cooperation to achieve¶ a real improvement in relations, we should avoid¶ the mistake of predicating our initiatives on the¶ actions of the Cuban government. The United¶ States must evaluate and act in its own interests.¶ We must not tie our every action to those of the¶ Cuban government, because doing so would allow Cuban officials to set U.S. policy, preventing¶ the United States from serving its own interests.¶ The majority of Cuban Americans now agree with¶ the American public that our half-century-old¶ policy toward Cuba has failed. For the first time¶ since Florida International University (FIU) began¶ polling Cuban American residents in 1991, a December 2008 poll found that a majority of Cuban¶ American voters favor ending current restrictions¶ on travel and remittances to Cuba, and support a¶ bilateral dialogue and normal diplomatic relations¶ with the Cuban regime by substantial margins.¶ The United States is isolated in its approach to¶ Cuba. In the 2008 United Nations General Assembly, 185 countries voted against the U.S. embargo¶ and only two,¶ Israel and¶ Palau, supported the U.S.¶ position. Although the international community¶ is opposed to the embargo, it remains concerned¶ about Cuba’s poor human rights record. At the¶ February 2009 Geneva Human¶ Rights Council,¶ Brazil, Chile, and Mexico asked¶ Cuba to respect¶ the rights of political opponents and give an "effective guarantee’’ of freedom of expression and¶ the right to travel. The European Union has long¶ maintained a policy of critical and constructive¶ engagement in its Common Position yet continues to engage the Cuban government in an effort ¶ to obtain the release of political prisoners and ensure greater freedoms for civil society, including¶ access to the internet.¶ If the United States were to¶ align its policies with these¶ governments—with¶ the addition of Canada, it would enhance our¶ united ability to forcefully make shared concerns¶ known to the Cuban government.¶ The prospect of significant revenues from oil, natural gas, and sugarcane ethanol in the next five¶ years could further integrate Cuba into global and¶ regional markets. While in the short term Cuba¶ will continue to be heavily dependent on Venezuela for subsidized fuel, in five years offshore oil¶ reserves, developed with Brazil, Spain, Norway,¶ and Malaysia, combined with the potential for¶ ethanol production with Brazil, may increase net¶ annual financial flows to Cuba by $3.8 billion (at¶ $50¶ per barrel of oil and $2.00 gallon of ethanol).¶ If democratic countries increase their economic ¶ stakes in Cuba, they will simultaneously enhance¶ their political influence with its current and future¶ leaders. To be relevant to Cuba, the Obama administration will need to shape its policies now.¶ The April 17, 2009 Summit of the Americas in¶ Trinidad and Tobago provides President Obama¶ with an opportunity to enhance U.S. credibility and¶ leadership in the region by signaling a new direction in U.S.-Cuba policy.¶ Rather than continuing¶ to demand preconditions for engaging the Cuban¶ government in the multilateral arena, the president¶ should encourage the Organization of American¶ States and international financial institutions to¶ support Cuba’s integration into their organizations¶ as long as it meets their membership criteria of human rights, democracy, and financial transparency.¶ If Cuba’s leaders know that Cuba can become a full¶ member upon meeting standard requirements,¶ they could have an incentive to carry out difficult¶ reforms that ultimately benefit the Cuban people.¶ The United States successfully engaged the Soviet¶ Union and China from 1973 onward. With those¶ governments the policy objective was to further¶ U.S. interests by reducing bilateral tension, expanding areas of cooperation, fostering cultural contacts,¶ and enmeshing the Soviet and Chinese economies¶ in international linkages that created incentives for¶ improved relations with the West. We continued to¶ voice our commitment to democracy and human¶ rights, and enhanced that argument by pressing the¶ Soviet Union to live up to international obligations.¶ By working with the region and the international¶ community, we can do much the same in Cuba. But¶ as the cases of the Soviet Union and China demonstrated, this approach can only be effective if we are¶ prepared to engage bilaterally and multilaterally.¶ A New U.S. Policy Of Critical And¶ Constructive Engagement¶ The advisory group of the Brookings project on¶ “U.S. policy toward a Cuba in Transition” came to¶ the unanimous conclusion that¶ President Barack¶ Obama should commit to a long-term process of¶ critical and constructive engagement at all levels,¶ including with the Cuban government. We believe¶ that only through engagement can the president¶ put into place a strategic vision that would permit¶ the United States to protect its interests and advance the desire we share with the hemisphere to¶ help the Cuban people become agents for peaceful¶ change from within the island. A decision by the¶ president to engage the Cuban government would¶ not reflect acceptance of its human rights abuses¶ or approval of its conduct. Instead, it would prove¶ a realistic evaluation and recognition of the extent¶ to which the Cuban government controls Cuba—¶ essential to the implementation of a new policy¶ that would permit us to work with the region, enhance our influence with the Cuban government,¶ and seek to help Cuba’s citizens expand the political space they need to influence their future.¶ Engagement should serve to enhance personal¶ contacts between Cuban and U.S. citizens and permanent residents, diminish Cuba’s attraction as a¶ rallying point for anti-American sentiment, and¶ burnish our standing in the region and the wider¶ international community.¶ If we engage, the Cuban¶ government will no longer be able to use the U.S.¶ threat as a credible excuse for human rights abuses¶ and restrictions on free speech, assembly, travel,¶ and economic opportunity. This in turn would¶ encourage the international community to hold¶ the Cuban government to the same standards of¶ democracy, rights and freedoms that it expects¶ from other governments around the world.¶ The Cuban hierarchy will not undertake openings¶ or respond to pressure from the international¶ community or the United States if it considers that¶ doing so would jeopardize its continued existence.¶ The key to a new dynamic in our relationship is¶ to embark on a course of a series of strategic actions that aim to establish a bilateral relationship¶ and put the United States on the playing field—to ¶ counter our hitherto self-imposed role of critical¶ observer. Our priority should be to serve U.S. interests and values in the confidence that if we do¶ so wisely and effectively, Cubans in the long run¶ will gain as well.¶ The Way Forward¶ It should be understood that engagement—while¶ having as a goal evolution to a peaceful and democratic Cuba—does not promise an overnight¶ metamorphosis.¶ Rather, it is a process, a pathway¶ with various detours and obstacles, that over time¶ arrives at its destination.¶ The roadmap for critical and constructive engagement is a long-term strategic vision made up of¶ baskets of short-, medium-, and long-term initiatives; all are within the authority of the Executive¶ Branch to enact. Each of the initiatives we suggest would advance one or more of the objectives¶ listed in the box below. ¶ The conduct and timing of foreign policy remains the prerogative of the president.¶ In order¶ to create a new dynamic in our bilateral relationship, we prefer that all the initiatives in the¶ short-term basket be carried out this year. We¶ acknowledge that it is likely that prior to moving on to the medium- and long-term baskets,¶ the president and his advisers will assess the¶ impact of the new policy on the United States,¶ Cuba, and the international community. Based¶ on their assessment, they will determine how¶ quickly to proceed with the medium- and long-¶ term baskets of initiatives.¶ If the Cuban response¶ is not encouraging, they might carry out only a¶ few of the suggested initiatives or lengthen the¶ time frame. However, it is important that they¶ continue to move toward a full normalization¶ of relations, because doing so would most effectively create conditions for a democratic evolution in Cuba. Equally important to the process is¶ garnering the support of Cuban Americans and¶ Congressional leaders. ¶ Given the strong sentiments and expectations¶ that Cuba engenders, it would be preferable for¶ the Executive Branch to proceed discreetly. The¶ president might first announce the principles he¶ hopes to achieve in Cuba through a policy of engagement that promotes human rights, the well-¶ being of the Cuban people, and the growth of¶ civil society. To carry out the president’s vision,¶ the Secretary of the Treasury will then have the¶ responsibility to write and publish the changes¶ to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations by licensing activities designed to achieve these ends.¶ The Secretary of State can quietly accomplish¶ many diplomatic initiatives on a reciprocal basis¶ without any need to publicize them. This quiet¶ diplomacy might be complemented by a refusal¶ to engage in what some refer to as megaphone¶ diplomacy, in which our governments trade insults across the Straits of Florida, and which only¶ contributes to making the United States appear¶ to be a bully.¶ The president’s leadership in carrying out a new¶ Cuba policy is essential because by law and prac¶ -¶ tice it is his responsibility to determine the over¶ -¶ all conduct of U.S. foreign policy.¶ In the case of¶ Cuba, he has ample executive authority to put¶ in place a policy of engagement. If he wishes,¶ he can expand bilateral diplomatic relations, re¶ -¶ move Cuba from the list of terrorist countries,¶ and rescind the current policy that grants im¶ -¶ mediate legal residency to Cubans who enter the¶ United States without visas. Should bilateral re¶ -¶ lations improve, he could choose to negotiate the¶ unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S.¶ citizens and review the status of Guantanamo¶ Bay Naval Base. ¶ Despite the myth that Congress must legislate¶ to change U.S. policy toward Cuba, history has¶ shown that presidents routinely take actions to¶ strengthen or loosen the embargo as they see fit.¶ Thus, like his predecessors,¶ President Obama can¶ change regulations in order to modify the Cuban¶ embargo without the need for an act of Congress.¶ He will, however, ultimately require Congress to¶ legislate in order to remove the embargo and lift¶ all restrictions on travel.¶ The Helms-Burton Act (H-B) of 1996 defines¶ conditions Cuba must meet for the United States¶ to end the embargo. The Act codified embargo¶ regulations, including the provision that states¶ that all transactions are prohibited except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury. Accordingly, the Secretary of the Treasury¶ may use his licensing authorities to extend, revise, or modify the same regulations.¶ President¶ Clinton did so by instructing Treasury to issue¶ licenses for various categories of travel, regulations that were subsequently codified by the¶ Trade Sanctions¶ Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000.¶ In view of the fact that,¶ unlike Helms-Burton, the TSRA did not provide¶ the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority¶ to modify its content, legislation is required to¶ remove or expand travel beyond the provisions¶ of the TSRA. Nevertheless, the president can¶ significantly expand travel to Cuba by reinstating provisions authorized by law but rescinded¶ under the Bush administration, and interpreting¶ more broadly all categories of travel codified in¶ the TSRA. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of¶ 1992 also legislated certain prohibitions, most¶ notably on U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with¶ Cuba, which, too, can only be revoked by an act¶ of Congress.¶ In sum, the president does not have the authority to end the embargo or lift the travel ban, but¶ can effectively dismantle the current commercial¶ embargo by using his licensing authority to permit U.S. exports of certain goods and services,¶ two-way trade in a wide variety of goods and¶ services, and/or allow broad categories of travel¶ to Cuba. ¶ The Engagement Roadmap¶ Short-Term Initiatives¶ During the campaign,¶ President Barack Obama¶ made clear that the Cuban government must¶ release all political prisoners if the United States¶ is to move toward normal relations. The initiatives in this first basket would permit greater interaction between the two governments and their¶ citizens, thereby setting the stage for improved¶ understanding and bilateral relations and the potential for enhanced U.S. influence on the island.¶ The more open travel and remittance measures¶ put in place by the Clinton administration in 1998¶ and continued by the Bush administration until¶ 2003 contributed to creating the conditions that¶ brought about a more open political atmosphere.¶ During the period now known as the “Cuban¶ Spring,” Oswaldo Payá, leader of the Varela¶ Project, worked with Cuba’s human rights activists¶ to collect 11,000 signatures on a petition that requested a referendum on the Cuban constitution.¶ Former¶ President Jimmy Carter gave a speech at¶ the University of Havana in Spanish in which he¶ asked Fidel Castro—who was sitting in the front¶ row—to permit the vote; the speech was broadcast live throughout the island. Martha Beatriz Roque, an important dissident leader, held a national assembly to advocate reforms to the Cuban¶ government.¶ Religious groups, with help from¶ their American counterparts, provided equipment, food, and medicines to sister organizations¶ that bolstered outreach to their communities.¶ Students from colleges throughout the United¶ States studying in Cuba were engaged in a lively¶ discussion with students, academics, and people¶ across the island.¶ The presence of licensed American and Cuban American visitors provided moral support,¶ advice, and assistance to diverse civil society¶ institutions, allowing them to expand and more¶ effectively assist their membership. And, interventions by U.S. government and private sector¶ personalities with high-level Cuban officials resulted in reducing repression against dissidents,¶ human rights activists, independent journalists,¶ and librarians. This more fluid and open atmosphere was essential to the growth of civil society and to the freedoms and creation of spaces¶ in which human rights activists and dissidents¶ could operate.¶ President Obama should replicate these conditions through unilateral and unconditional actions that promote enhanced human contact by¶ generously licensing all categories of travel permitted in the TSRA. He should, first, follow his¶ campaign promise to grant Cuban Americans¶ unrestricted rights to family travel and to send¶ remittances to the island, since Cuban American¶ connections to family are our best tool for helping¶ to foster the beginnings of grass-roots democracy¶ on the island. Further, the president should expand travel for all American citizens and permanent residents by instructing the Office of Foreign¶ Assets Control (OFAC) to license people-to-people travel for educational, cultural, and humanitarian purposes.¶ Cuban citizens should also be permitted to travel to the United States for a variety of purposes¶ —including family, academic and cultural visits—in order to enhance their understanding of¶ our open and democratic society. The Secretary¶ of State should instruct the Department of State¶ and the United States¶ Interests Section (US¶ INT)¶ in Havana to use standard criteria applied around¶ the world for awarding non-immigrant visas¶ to Cubans. This more tolerant approach would¶ strengthen the bonds of family and culture, while¶ helping the Cuban people improve their lives¶ and grow the social organizations necessary for a¶ democratic civil society. ¶ Diplomatic travel and interaction must be reciprocally expanded so that our diplomats in Havana¶ have the knowledge, access, and expertise needed¶ to predict, evaluate, and deal with any eventuality in Cuba. This requires permitting comparable¶ opportunities to Cuban diplomats posted in¶ Washington. There is little the United States has to¶ fear by allowing Cuban diplomats to see for themselves the realities of American life. To reduce¶ illegal migration, enhance our security, and conserve our fisheries, the State Department should¶ resume migration talks at the Deputy Assistant¶ Secretary level and begin a dialogue between the¶ respective heads of the Interests Sections on other¶ issues of mutual concern, including the environment, health, and counter-narcotics.¶ The devastation caused by hurricanes that struck¶ Cuba in 2008 generated considerable concern¶ among Cubans in the United States and among¶ the broader American public. Unfortunately, disagreements and distrust between our governments prevented the United States from assisting¶ with relief efforts.¶ In order to avoid a recurrence of¶ this impasse, the Department of State should seek¶ an understanding or agreement with the Cuban¶ government that would permit U.S. assistance to¶ Cuba for natural disasters.¶ Measures are now in place to ensure that public¶ resources that provide support to the Cuban people are well used by USAID grantees. However,¶ large contracts concluded in the final months of¶ the Bush administration with non-profit organizations and private companies that are said to¶ promote or manage a transition in Cuba may not¶ reflect the current administration’s objectives. A¶ review should be conducted to determine whether these contracts should be continued, modified,¶ or canceled.¶ Additionally, although OFAC has always had the¶ authority to license the importation of lifesaving medicines developed in Cuba for testing by¶ the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), it¶ has made the process cumbersome and lengthy.¶ The sad conclusion is that OFAC has been more¶ concerned with the financial benefits that might¶ accrue to Cuba than with the potential of these¶ medicines to treat children with brain tumors and¶ adults with lung cancer or meningitis. To reduce¶ bureaucratic hurdles and permit the speedy entry¶ of life-saving medications into the United States,¶ OFAC regulations should be modified or reinterpreted so that the only barrier to the entry of¶ Cuban manufactured medicines is that they meet¶ FDA standards—the same criteria that apply to all¶ medical imports.¶ The president should also seek to promote the¶ free flow of ideas and information, including the¶ creation of music, films, and other works of art¶ as embodied in¶ Representative Howard Berman’s¶ 1988 Free Trade in¶ Ideas Act. Despite the prohibition against the U.S. government restricting the¶ importation of all informational materials, successive administrations have narrowly interpreted the Berman Act in order to prohibit Americans from creating music, films, and other artistic¶ works with Cubans. These prohibitions were not¶ intended by the statutes and should be removed.¶ The aforementioned initiatives are non-controversial and widely supported by the American public.¶ More controversial—although still enjoying widespread public support—would be licensing the sale¶ and donation of all communications equipment,¶ including radios, televisions, and computers. The¶ CDA recognized the importance of expanding¶ access to ideas, knowledge, and information by¶ authorizing the licensing of telecommunications¶ goods and services. U.S. government financing of¶ books and radios that are distributed to Cubans¶ throughout the island demonstrates a belief that¶ breaking down the barriers to the flow of information is critical to promoting change in Cuba. The¶ president should therefore instruct the Department¶ of Commerce and OFAC to internally change their ¶ respective licensing policies with regard to Cuba¶ from a “presumption of denial” to a “presumption¶ of approval” with respect to items deemed to be¶ in the U.S. national interest for Cuba to receive,¶ including laptops, cell phones and other telecommunications equipment, computer peripherals,¶ internet connection equipment, as well as access¶ to satellite and broadband communications networks.¶ The following initiatives that would provide assistance for civil society and for activities that¶ help the Cuban people become agents for change¶ would require, in some cases, a formal understanding with the Cuban government, and, in¶ others, at least a willingness to permit the activity.¶ We believe that if these activities were permitted¶ by the United States and the Cuban governments,¶ they would help to prepare the Cuban people for¶ assuming a greater role in their governance.¶ The U.S. government should act to enhance the¶ flow of resources to the Cuban people.¶ It should¶ license U.S. non-governmental organizations and¶ private individuals to transfer funds to individuals¶ and civil society organizations in Cuba that work¶ to foster a more open society. The United States¶ should also encourage the creation of multilateral¶ funds that promote the same objective. Such assistance should not be subject to an ideological¶ test but rather be available to Cuban civic entities¶ in the form of microcredit for small businesses¶ and for salaries of persons engaged by civil society¶ to provide community services, among others.¶ Although the U.S. government currently manages¶ an assistance program for Cuba, it is limited by¶ sanctions regulations and is narrowly focused.¶ Much of the assistance—amounting principally¶ to in-kind goods—is difficult to deliver due to the¶ opposition of the Cuban government either to the¶ type of assistance or to the groups or individuals¶ receiving it. In order to better serve the needs of¶ civil society in Cuba, the U.S. government should¶ seek to obtain the approval of the Cuban government for an assistance program that would provide financial and in-kind assistance for activities¶ that advance human rights and the rule of law,¶ encourage microenterprise, and promote educational, and professional exchanges.¶ The issue of whether Cuba should be classified by¶ the U.S. government as a terrorist state has many¶ supporters and detractors. However, the reasons¶ listed for Cuba’s inclusion on the list appear to be¶ insufficient, thus leading to charges that the list is¶ a political tool for appeasing domestic constituencies. ¶ In order to ensure that this important vehicle¶ in U.S. policy is used appropriately, a review of the¶ evidence should be conducted. If Cuba is legitimately found to be a terrorist state based on the¶ evidence over the last five years, it should remain¶ on the list; if not, it should be removed.¶ Finally, it is in our interest to see Cuba reintegrated¶ into the Organization of American States (OAS) if¶ it meets membership standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. To this end, and in¶ order to provide incentives for reform, the United¶ Sates should not object to the OAS Secretary General discussing with Cuba the requirements for¶ reinstatement as a full member.¶ In addition, the¶ United States should not object to Cuba’s participation in OAS specialized and technical agencies. ¶ Medium-Term Initiatives¶ The second basket of initiatives is distinct from the¶ first because it moves beyond enhancing the ability¶ of Cubans to take a more proactive and informed¶ part in their society and government. The initiatives in the second basket seek to build a foundation for reconciliation by beginning a process of¶ resolving long-standing differences. A number¶ of these initiatives could serve as incentives or ¶ rewards for improved human rights, the release¶ of political prisoners, and greater freedom of assembly, speech and rights for opposition groups¶ and labor unions.¶ Initiatives that fall within this¶ category include allowing Cuba access to normal commercial instruments for the purchase of¶ goods from the United States.¶ None of the initiatives, however, should be publicly¶ or privately tied to specific Cuban actions. As the¶ Cuban government is on record as rejecting any¶ type of carrot-and-stick tactic, it would be counterproductive to do so.¶ Rather, the United States¶ should decide the actions that it wishes to take¶ and when to carry them out. Doing so will give¶ the president maximum flexibility in determining¶ how and when to engage.¶ The first two initiatives simply encourage a broadening of U.S. government public and private participation in activities that assist the growth of¶ Cuban civil society and should be carried out regardless of Cuba’s conduct. The U.S. government¶ should expand the assistance envisioned in the¶ first basket by encouraging other governments,¶ multilateral institutions, organizations, and individuals to support educational exchanges as¶ well as the improvement of human rights and the¶ growth of civil society.¶ In addition, in order to enhance access to knowledge, the U.S. government¶ should allow private individuals, groups, and the¶ Cuban government access to normal commercial¶ credit for the sale of communications equipment¶ and connections to satellite and broadband networks.¶ Licensing U.S. companies to provide services for¶ the development of Cuban offshore oil and gas¶ would provide benefits to the United States and¶ Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the¶ Secretary of Treasury has always had and continues to have the authority—as embodied in OFAC¶ regulations—to license any transaction found to¶ be in the U.S. national interest. This power has¶ been used over the past fifteen years by various¶ Republican and Democratic administrations to¶ license a variety of commercial transactions between the United States and Cuba). The following¶ are some of the reasons we might wish to become¶ engaged in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and¶ gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable companies¶ are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil development¶ it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela¶ for two-thirds of its oil imports. Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards¶ of transparency develop these resources rather¶ than, for example,¶ Russia’s notoriously corrupt¶ oligarchy. Third, U.S. influence in Cuba is likely¶ to increase if U.S. companies have an economic¶ relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S. companies have the technology and expertise to develop¶ Cuba’s offshore oil and gas.¶ As we have pointed out, U.S. actions should not¶ be constrained by linking them to specific Cuban¶ responses. Nevertheless, the following initiatives¶ will depend on a significant change in bilateral¶ and multilateral relations. Membership in regional and multilateral organizations ultimately depends on Cuba meeting membership criteria and¶ gaining approval. Therefore, if Cuba meets the¶ membership criteria of the OAS, it should be reinstated. The same should be the case if Cuba meets¶ the standards of international financial institutions. However, Helms-Burton instructs the U.S.¶ government to oppose Cuba’s membership—even¶ if it has complied with institutional standards—if¶ it has not met specific criteria relating to our bilateral relationship. We believe that the authority for¶ the U.S. government to determine how it will vote¶ in international institutions should be returned¶ to the Executive Branch of government. The¶ Helms-Burton language on OAS reinstatement is¶ slightly more permissive than that regarding the¶ international financial institutions—“The president should instruct the United States¶ Permanent Representative to the Organization of American¶ States...”—in contrast to—“The Secretary of the ¶ Treasury shall instruct the United States executive¶ director of each international financial institution¶ to use the voice and vote of the United States to¶ oppose the admission of Cuba.”¶ In both cases it¶ would be preferable if Congress would return¶ these prerogatives to the president.¶ Since this paper deals solely with initiatives within the realm of Executive Authority, lifting the¶ travel ban was beyond its scope. Nevertheless, the¶ majority of the advisers felt that the ban had been¶ counter-productive and should be lifted.¶ In an¶ effort to reach consensus and also maintain our¶ initiatives within the realm of Executive Authority, we have recommended that the president seek¶ to regain the authority to determine what if any¶ travel restrictions should apply to U.S. citizens¶ and permanent residents who wish to visit Cuba.¶ In doing so, the Executive Branch would decide¶ the timing and degree to which to expand licensing for additional categories of travel or to lift the¶ travel ban altogether.¶ As for bilateral relations, if the conditions are right,¶ we would prefer the exchange of ambassadors and¶ the establishment of embassies. A stronger presence in Cuba would strengthen our capacity to assess political and power relationships, make local¶ contacts, advocate directly with the Cuban government over issues that are in our interest, understand opportunities for Cuban entrepreneurship, and explore areas where the international¶ community can engage to promote reform. However, since we have limited this paper to actions¶ that the Executive Branch can take unilaterally,¶ we have not suggested the exchange of ambassadors because confirmation is required from the¶ Senate.¶ It is our hope that, at the appropriate time,¶ the president and the Senate would agree to move¶ forward in this area. However, should this not be¶ the case or should the president desire a different approach, he can improve and upgrade our¶ relations by sending a more senior envoy to lead¶ the United States Interests Section or by naming a¶ special envoy for Cuban relations. ¶ Finally, the U.S. cannot ignore indefinitely the issues that have bedeviled U.S.-Cuban relationship.¶ Within this framework, the U.S. should open discussions on the claims of United States citizens¶ for expropriated property. Equally difficult but¶ just as compelling will be to initiate dialogue on¶ the issue of sovereignty and use of the territory¶ currently occupied by the U.S. Guantanamo Bay¶ Naval Base. The administration should begin discussions to provide a broad framework for resolution of these issues.¶ Long-Term Initiatives¶ This last basket of initiatives may be taken by the¶ president but it would be preferable if our bilateral relationship were such that Congress had already taken steps to remove the final barriers to¶ a normal diplomatic relationship. This would include removing Cuba from the Trading with the¶ Enemy Act (TWEA) and rescinding or modifying¶ Helms-Burton, the TSRA, and the CDA.¶ If Congress were receptive to a review of the aforementioned laws but not yet prepared to move forward,¶ the president should continue to deepen our engagement by expanding our diplomatic presence¶ and by permitting the reciprocal opening of consular offices in major cities. Foreign assistance¶ to the Cuban government is restricted by the¶ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, with the exception of the provision of assistance to any government for internal disaster relief, rehabilitation,¶ and health. The president could also license further categories of goods and services for export¶ and the importation of certain Cuban goods in¶ addition to medicines approved by the FDA.¶ President Obama has stated that full normalization¶ of relations will depend on improved human rights¶ and progress toward democracy in Cuba. A truly¶ successful and mutually beneficial relationship be¶ -¶ tween our countries will also be determined by the¶ degree of reconciliation between Cubans in exile¶ and Cubans on the island. Concerns about illegal¶ acts and human rights abuses on both sides must¶ be reviewed and solutions must be found. This is¶ also true in the case of expropriated property, made¶ more complex by Cuban claims of damages for injuries allegedly caused by the embargo.¶ Leaving¶ these issues unresolved would not only stunt trade¶ and investment, it would deprive the Cuban people¶ of fully utilizing their talents and improving their¶ lives.¶ Resolution of claims for expropriated prop¶ -¶ erty, as well as the restoration of Cuban sovereignty¶ over the territory of Guantanamo Bay, is essential¶ to a prosperous and democratic Cuba and to the¶ achievement of a healthy and normal relationship¶ between our two countries.

#### No impact – rest of Latin America prevents back-sliding

Fauriol and Weintraub 95 (Georges Fauriol, director of the CSIS Americas program, and Sidney Weintraub, Prof of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, The Washington Quarterly, "U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone", Lexis)

The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world.

# 1AR

### 1ar definitions

#### A2 should = mandatory

Words & Phrases 6 (Permanent Edition 39, p. 369)

C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2001. Word “should,” in most contexts, is precatory, not mandatory. –U.S. v. Rogers, 14 Fed.Appx. 303. –Statut 227.

#### A2 should = immediate

Dictionary.com – Copyright © 2010 – http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should

should    /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall —Can be confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). —Synonyms 3. See must1 . —Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should (American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall. Shall –auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est, 3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1. plan to, ***intend*** to, or expect to: I shall go later.